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Many internet auction sites implement ascending-bid, second-price auctions. Empirically, last-
minute or “late” bidding is frequently observed in “hard-close” but not in “soft-close” versions of
these auctions. In this paper, we introduce an independent private-value repeated internet auction
model to explain this observed diﬀerence in bidding behavior. We use ﬁnite automata to model the
repeated auction strategies. We report results from simulations involving populations of artiﬁcial
bidders who update their strategies via a genetic algorithm. We show that our model can deliver
late or early bidding behavior, depending on the auction closing rule in accordance with the empirical
evidence. As an interesting result, we observe that hard-close auctions raise less revenue than soft-
close auctions. We also investigate interesting properties of the evolving strategies and arrive at some
conclusions regarding both auction designs from a market design point of view.
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Since the advent of the world wide web, an increasing number of goods are being traded using on—line,
“internet auctions”.1 The most popular internet auction sites are those run by eBay, Amazon, and Yahoo!
While these sites implement several diﬀerent auction formats, the most common and widely used format
is an ascending-bid, second-price format that is a hybrid of the ascending-bid English auction and the
second-price sealed bid auction. However, this hybrid format is strategically diﬀerent from the sealed-bid
second-price auctions and ascending-bid English auctions.2 Indeed, the advent of the internet auction has
led to a new theoretical and empirical literature devoted to exploring this new auction format.3
There are two popular ascending-bid, second-price formats used by internet auction sites. The ﬁrst of
these, a “hard-close” auction, closes at the end of a ﬁxed preset time period, typically one or two weeks.
The high bidder wins the object by paying the second highest bid plus some small increment.4 The second
type, a “soft-close” auction, closes at the end of a ﬁxed duration if and only if no bidder submits a “late”
bid within a certain interval of time near the closing time (e.g., last 10 minutes). Otherwise, the auction is
extended for a ﬁxed and known additional period of time (e.g., 10 more minutes), starting from the time
of submission of the last bid.5
An interesting phenomenon, known to participants in hard-close internet auction sites and empirically
documented by Roth and Ockenfels (2002) is that of “last—minute” or “late” bidding, which practitioners
call “sniping.” Speciﬁcally, more bids are submitted close to, or just at the end of a hard-close auction
than are submitted near the scheduled end of soft-close auctions. Further, the number of bids per bidder
is higher in hard-close than in soft-close auctions. Ockenfels and Roth (2002) present a model that can
rationalize late bidding as an equilibrium strategy in hard-close auctions under both private-value and
common-value auctions.6 However, late-bidding is just one equilibrium possibility; all bidders bidding
early remains another.
In modelling late-bidding as an equilibrium phenomenon, Ockenfels and Roth rely on the assumption
that there is some probability that bids submitted in the ﬁnal period of the hard-close auction will fail
to be properly transmitted to the auction software, due either to internet congestion or to human-related
factors such as high monitoring costs. Bidders in hard-close auctions who adopt a mutual, late-biding
1For instance, eBay Inc. reports steady growth in its annual gross merchandise volume — the total value of all successfully
closed listings on eBay’s trading platforms (primarily auction listings) — from $95 million in 1997 to $34.2 billion in 2004.
2See Vickrey (1961) for second-price auctions and English auctions. See Milgrom and Weber (1982) and McAfee and
McMillan (1987) for symmetric auctions.
3See Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) for a survey of the economics literature on the subject.
4This format was originally implemented by eBay.
5This auction format was originally implemented by Amazon. It has a “going-going-gone...” feature as in English auctions.
6The type of item sold determines whether the auction is a common-value or a private-value auction. Antique coin auctions
are examples of common-value auctions and computer part auctions are examples of private-value auctions. In this paper,
we focus on private-value auctions only.
1strategy may therefore occasionally win items at low prices. That is, the end-of-auction congestion creates
a potentially large ex-ante surplus for them, and the potential to capture this surplus is what rationalizes
their late bidding strategy.7
In this paper, we develop a simple model of internet auction behavior with the aim of understanding
the evolution of bidding behavior in hard- and soft- close auctions with various numbers of bidders. Our
model involves a single seller oﬀering an item for which bidders have independent, private-values. The
bidders are the only active players. The bidders play their strategies against each other repeatedly in
either hard-close or soft-close multi-period (dynamic) auctions. They have a “selective” message space
concerning the history of previous auctions: speciﬁcally, they care only about the timing of rival bids in
the most recently completed auction. Bidder strategies specify the amount and timing of a bidder’s bids
within a dynamic auction and these strategies may or may not condition on the history of rival bids in
the most recently completed auction. While our model of bidding behavior is quite simple, it is ﬂexible
enough to allow early or late bidding as well as history contingent or unconditional bidding behavior.
As there are multiple bidding strategies that can comprise equilibria in repeated auctions (e.g. all bid
early or all bid late as shown by Ockenfels and Roth (2002)), we adopt an agent-based computational
approach, with the aim of ﬁnding optimal bidding strategies for a given, repeated-auction environment.
Speciﬁcally we analyze the evolution of bidding behavior by n bidders under hard- and soft- close auctions
using a “genetic algorithm” (Holland, 1975), which is a versatile search and optimization tool for large
strategy spaces. Genetic algorithms optimize on the eﬃcient boundary between exploiting strategies that
have worked well in the past and exploring new strategies (Goldberg, 1989). Alternatively, one can think
of a genetic algorithm as a model of social learning (Dawid, 1999) or as a macroeconomy with heterogenous
agents (Arifovic, 2000). In a genetic algorithm, the better strategies (as measured by payoﬀs) of the current
generation of players are copied and/or modiﬁed and then transmitted for use by future generations.
We report the results of several simulation exercises using artiﬁcial bidders who use strategies updated
by a genetic algorithm. The format of the strategies and the method by which these strategies evolve is
the same in both the hard- and soft-close auctions. Nevertheless, in all of our simulations we consistently
ﬁnd that hard-close auctions lead to much more frequent use of late bidding strategies than do soft-close
auctions, even as we vary certain parameters, e.g., the number of bidders is varied from 2 to 5. Further,
7Ockenfels and Roth (2002) also claim that late bidding can be caused by the presence of naive incremental bidders. As
evidence of this, they show evidence of multiple submission of bids by the same bidder. On the other hand, Bajari and
Hortaçsu (2003) explain multiplicity of bids by on-going updating related to the common-value aspect of many items begin
auctioned. Empirically, Hasker, Gonzalez and Sickles (2004) show that the type of late bidding equilibrium introduced by
Ockenfels and Roth (2002) and a type of early bidding equilibrium (a variant of the equilibria introduced by Avery (1998)
for English auctions) are not actually played by bidders. A recent experimental paper by Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth (2005)
conﬁrms that hard-close auctions are prone to late bidding while soft-close auctions are not. In an interesting study, Borle,
Boatwright and Kadane (2005) classiﬁes e-Bay auctions on a scale from private-value to common-values using data that
explains whether there was late and multiple bidding in a given auction. There are other empirical papers which explain
various aspects of internet auctions. An incomplete list includes Lucking-Reiley (1999, 2000), Melnik and Alm (2001).
2we ﬁnd that sellers are relatively worse oﬀ in hard-close auctions than in soft-close auctions in that their
average revenue in hard-close auctions is lower. Not surprisingly, the reverse ﬁnding holds for buyers who do
better (receive, on average, a larger surplus) in hard-close auctions than in soft-close auctions. We perform
some sensitivity analysis and show how some of our ﬁndings may be dependent on the choice of model
parameters such as those governing the distribution of private valuations or the number of bidders. By way
of an explanation for our ﬁndings, we present evidence of a greater variety of bidding strategies in hard-
close versus soft-close auctions; in particular, the use of history contingent bidding strategies is much more
common in hard-close auctions than in soft-close auctions. Finally, we inspect the evolution of adaptive
bidding strategies in the presence of naive incremental bidding agents. The existence of such incremental
bidders is consistent with behavior observed empirically, both in the ﬁeld and in an experiment by Ariely,
Ockenfels and Roth (2005). The addition of incremental bidders serves only to widen the diﬀerence we
observe in the frequency of late bidding behavior between hard-close (where it remains high) and soft-close
auctions (where it is infrequent) relative to the diﬀerence we found in simulations without these incremental
bidders. We conclude that agent-based computational economics can be used as a tool for market designers
interested in predicting outcomes under various auction formats.
2I n t e r n e t A u c t i o n R u l e s
In this section, we explain the general rules of the hard- and soft-close internet auction that we formally
introduce in the next section as an auction model. We start with hard-close auctions. A hard-close auction
is a dynamic auction. Each seller can post a single item for sale for a certain ﬁxed amount of time on the
internet auction website. Prior to the end of the auction (the hard-close), any bidder can submit a bid at
any time. At any moment during the auction, the “current bid” or price of the object for sale is deﬁned
to be the second highest bid submitted thus far (if any) plus a small increment. Setting a reserve price is
also an option. Any new bid lower than the current bid is considered an invalid bid.
A valid internet auction bid of some amount b in excess of the “current bid” or price is called a “proxy
bid”. It is more properly viewed as a proxy biding rule that automatically increments the high bidders’s
bid as new bids come in to challenge that bid (plus a small increment), enabling a high bidder to retain his
high bid position, so long as the new bid amount necessary for the high bidder to retain high bid status
does not exceed the maximum amount bid, b (and the owner of the old high bid is a diﬀerent bidder than
the owner of b). Otherwise, a bidder who has bid b is outbid and a new high bidder takes his place (with
the same proxy bidding rule working for that bidder). When the predetermined time of the auction runs
out, the current high bidder wins the auction at the current bid price.
The rules of soft-close auctions are similar, but with one important diﬀerence. Every valid proxy bid
submitted within t minutes of the scheduled end of the auction causes that auction to be extended t more
minutes starting from this last bid. The auction is concluded t minutes after the last valid proxy bid
3is submitted. If a new valid proxy bid is is submitted during this time, the auction is extended t more
minutes, and so on. When the auction is ﬁnally concluded, the high bidder wins the object at the current
bid price.
In the next section, we will extensively discuss the formal model we use and how it relates to the
real-time implementation of bids in these auctions.
3 The Internet Auction Model
In order to tractably analyze bidding behavior in internet auctions consistent with the description given
above, we consider a highly simpliﬁed model of an internet auction but one that captures all of the essential
features of these auctions. In particular, suppose the internet auction involves a single seller, who is oﬀering
an indivisible object without any reserve price. Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of bidders, each of whom
is risk neutral in money. We will sometimes refer to the bidders as “agents,” or “strategies,” since in
our analysis bidders are the only active players. Each agent has a valuation for the object; this valuation
serves as the agent’s “type”. Each agent’s valuation is an independently and identically distributed draw
from a discrete probability density function g, that is the same for all agents. Agents’ valuations are all
drawn at the beginning of each internet auction and remain ﬁxed for the duration of that auction. Each
bidder knows his own type and the probability density function g used to determine other agents’ types.
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2 + k 
nV −1 for some k ∈{ 0,1,...,n V − 1},
0 otherwise.
The internet auction is a “standard auction” in which the high bidder wins the object by paying a fee
to the seller. No other bidder pays a fee to the seller and the seller subsidizes no bidders.
We model the internet auction as a dynamic Bayesian game in which there are T consecutive bidding
periods, indexed by t =1 ,2,...,T. The discrete choice for bidding periods is necessary for our agent-based
model and is also consistent with the design of complementary experimental studies (discussed later in
the paper). In each period t, each bidder can submit “at most” one bid over the internet to a software
program. A bid submitted in one of the ﬁrst T − 1 bidding periods is always registered by the software
program correctly. However, a bid that is submitted in the ﬁnal period T is correctly registered by the
software program with some ﬁxed probability ρ ≤ 1. The latter assumption captures congestion eﬀects or
bidder timing mistakes in the scheduled end period of an auction.
The dynamic internet auction rules are as follows. When there are no bids submitted, the smallest
admissible bid is equal to some ﬁxed and known increment ∆ > 0. When the ﬁrst admissible bid not
smaller than ∆ arrives, the second bid is set to ∆. The owner of this ﬁrst admissible bid becomes the “high
bidder.”
4Consider any bidding period. Let bid b∗ be the current high bid, bid b2 be the current second bid, and
bidder i∗ be the current high bidder. Bidders only observe the second bid b2 and the identity of the high
bidder i∗. All bidders simultaneously submit their bids in this bidding period. However, the arrival order
of these bids to the computer program (internet website) is not simultaneous. The arrival order of bids
is determined by a randomly drawn permutation of all n bidders. Each permutation is equally likely to
occur.
Suppose bid b is the ﬁrst correctly registered bid in period t and bidder i be the owner of bid b. Three
cases are possible:
1. b>b ∗: In this case, we compare the identities of bidder i and the high bidder i∗. There are two
possibilities:
(a) Bidder i is diﬀerent from bidder i∗. In this case,
i. bid b becomes the new high bid,
ii. bid b∗ becomes the new second bid, and
iii. bidder i becomes the new high bidder.
(b) Bidder i is the same agent as bidder i∗. In this case, bid b becomes the new high bid. The
second bid and the identity of the high bidder do not change.
2. b∗ ≥ b ≥ b2 +∆:Bid b becomes the new second bid. The high bid and the identity of the high
bidder do not change.
3. b2+∆>b: The high bid, the second bid, and the identity of the high bidder do not change. In this
case, bid b is regarded as an invalid bid; it does not get counted in statistics reporting on submitted
bids.
Here cases 1 and 2 reﬂect the proxy feature of the submitted bids. In case (1a), an implicit bidding war
among proxy bids b and b∗ determines the new high bidder as the owner of b at the price b∗ +∆ . In case
(1b), the new bid b only reﬂects an update of the high bidder regarding his older bid without aﬀecting the
second bid (current “price”). In case (2), the proxy-bid b∗ responds to the proxy-bid b by posting a new
bid that is incrementally higher than b.
After bid b, the second arriving bid is processed in a similar fashion using the updated information
concerning the high bid, the second bid, and the high bidder. Other bids are processed in a similar manner.
We consider two ending procedures for the internet auction. In a “hard-close auction,” the auction
closes after the last bid of period T is processed. The high bidder at the end of period T wins the object
by paying the “price.” The price is equal to the second bid plus increment ∆ if that is not greater than
the high bid. Otherwise, the price is equal to the high bid.
5In a “soft-close auction,” the auction closes after period T if and only if a valid bid does not register
in period T. Otherwise, the auction is extended one more period where the agents simultaneously submit
their bids. The auction closes if and only if a valid bid does not register in the extension period. Otherwise,
the auction is extended one more period. After one of the extension periods, the auction ends if and only
if no new valid bid registers. The rules for bid registration in any extension period t>Tare the same as
for period T. Hence, a submitted bid may fail to register with probability 1 − ρ. The high bidder at the
end of the soft-close auction wins the object by paying the current bid price. Note that, by design, a ﬁnite
end is guaranteed to the soft-close auction by the ﬁnite number of agent types; one agent will have the
highest valuation, and bidding cannot exceed this value.
An internet auction strategy σi for bidder i is a list of bids at each period t ∈{ 1,2,....} for every type
of bidder i and for every possible history of: (i) bidder i’s bids in periods 1,...,t− 1,, (ii) the identity of
the high bidders in every period 1,...,t− 1, and (iii) the second bids in every period 1,...,t− 1.
3.1 Repeated Auctions and Modelling Repeated Game Strategies
Each agent plays a block of R consecutive dynamic, internet auctions. Each auction in a block is also
referred to as a “round” or “stage game”. The type (valuation) of each agent is redetermined via another
draw from g at the beginning of each round. The utility of agent i is the discounted summation of stage
game utilities. Let δ ∈ (0,1] be the discount factor. After each auction, bidders can observe the “bid
history” of the previous auction. A bid history is a list which shows the bids of each agent at each period
of the auction. Let r ∈{ 1,2,...,R} index rounds of the repeated auctions. A “history” hr is deﬁned as
a list of bid histories in rounds 1,...,r− 1. History h1 is the empty set. A repeated game strategy si of
bidder i is a list of stage game strategies σi |hr￿ for each possible history hr￿ for each round r￿ ∈{ 1,2,3,...}.
This strategy representation is obviously quite complicated. For modelling purposes, it will therefore
be useful to limit the space of admissible strategies. We make three main assumptions on the admissible
strategy space:
1. A stage game strategy for agent i depends only on the previous bids of agent i and his type. Further,
we permit just four possible bids for each bidder in a bidding period. The bid of bidder i with type




3vi or 0. Bidding 0 means that bidder i does not submit a
bid in that period.8
2. In extension periods of a soft-close auction t>T, we permit just two possible bids: vi or 0. Further,
bidder i’s bid is restricted to be the same in every extension period.
8We do not allow bids greater than the bidder’s private value simply because bidding above one’s private value is always
dominated by a bid equal to the private value. The argument for this result is the same as Vickrey’s (1961) argument for
second price auctions with independent private values.
63. In the repeated auction game, history hr is “subjective” and “selective” for each bidder. Speciﬁcally,
each bidder i’s history, hi
r is characterized by the timing of the last round (r − 1) bids of his rivals,
and only two possible histories are permitted. History hi
r =late denotes the state where, in round
r −1, a rival bid arrived in period t ≥ T. History hi
r =early denotes the state were, in round r − 1,
no rival bid arrived in any period t ≥ T.
This simpliﬁed model captures the essential features and rules of internet auctions, but some of our
simpliﬁcations have important consequences. Assumption (1), for instance, eliminates incremental bidding
in response to rival bids by other bidders. While seemingly restrictive, this assumption nevertheless leads to
diﬀerent bidding behavior in hard and soft-close auctions consistent with the empirical evidence. However,
as such incremental bidding is thought to play a role in bidding behavior, later in the paper we will
exogenously introduce (pre-programmed) naive incremental bidders who submit only incrementally higher
bids and we will investigate the evolution of adaptive bidding strategies in the presence of these naive
bidders. Assumption (2) is just a simpliﬁcation that eliminates cumbersome bidding strategies in the
extension periods.9 Assumption (3) eliminates the price dimension from the history of previous auctions
and focuses on the timing issues that are the focus of our analysis. An analysis of more complicated internet
bidding strategies that relax some or all of these assumptions may lead to greater insights than can be
provided using our model. Nevertheless, as we show below, our model suﬃces to generate diﬀerences in
bidding behavior between the two auction formats that is consistent with the empirical evidence.
In the next subsection, we illustrate the admissible strategies in great detail.
3.2 Finite Automata as Repeated Game Strategies
The repeated auction strategy of each bidder i, si, is approximated by a “ﬁnite automata” representation
(Moore, 1956).10 An “automaton” is a string of integers that describe a stage game strategy and the next
move of the bidder for each history of the game.
In our implementation, there are just two histories, “early” and “late,” upon which bidders can condition
their bidding strategy. To allow for history-contingent, “repeated game” strategies, we therefore allow two
automata for each strategy, one for each possible history.11 Each automaton consists of two parts: (i)
the “stage game” (internet auction) strategy and (ii) two indexes. These two indexes determine which
9This assumption is not unrealistic as our simulations reveal that in both the hard- and soft-close formats, nearly all
bidders learn to bid their full private values.
10Finite automata are frequently used in representing repeated game strategies theoretically, computationally and exper-
imentally. See Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) for the theory of Nash equilibria with ﬁnite automata in repeated games. See
Miller (1996) for an application with genetic algorithms in repeated prisonners’ dilemma. See Engle-Warnick and Slonim
(2005) for an application to inference of human strategies from experimental data.
11This is the minimal number of automata necessary for implementation of repeated game strategies. Nevertheless, we
believe that our implementation is suﬃciently general to characterize a wide range of possible bidding strategies in repeated
internet auctions.
7automaton will be used after the current stage game strategy in each possible history. A representation of
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Consider automaton j ∈{ 1,2} A stage game strategy σi
j is a list of 3 integers for a hard-close auction
or 4 integers for a soft-close auction. (The particular ending-rule of the auction is assumed to be known in
advance). The automaton σi
j that is part of bidder i’s strategy in a hard-close auction is illustrated below:





























jk for every k ∈{ 1,2,3} is a period number, that is σi
jk ∈{ 0,1,2,...,T}. The ﬁrst number in the
string, σi
j1, is the period when bidder i will bid his entire value. The second number, σi
j2, is the period
when bidder i will bid two thirds of his value. The third number, σi
j3, is the period when bidder i will bid
one third of his value. Period 0 means that bidder i will not bid that particular fraction in any period of
the auction. Period 1 means the bidder will bid that particular fraction in period 1, etc.12
The automaton σi
j that is part of bidder i’s strategy in a soft-close auction is illustrated below:
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jk for every k ∈{ 1,2,3} is a period number, that is σi
jk ∈{ 0,1,2,...,T}. The ﬁrst three integers
have identical roles to their roles in a hard-close stage auction strategy. The fourth integer, σi
j4, is binary,
i.e., it lies in {0,1}. When σi
j4 =1 , bidder i will bid his entire value in every extension period. When
σi
j4 =0 , bidder i will not bid anything in any extension period.
12If a bidder’s strategy calls for bidding a larger value, e.g., the full value vi,i ns o m ep e r i o dt and a smaller value (e.g.,
1/3(vi)) in some later period, t + k, the smaller, later bid is not submitted. Even if we did not restrict the possibility of
declining bids by the same bidder, the bid improvement rule of the internet auction insures that any bid smaller than the
current bid plus some increment never registers as a valid bid. Hence our restriction simply amounts to reducing the number
of invalid bids submitted.
8The next two integers, Li
j and Ei
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These indicate which automaton will be selected for the next auction (stage game). When the subjective
history is late, automaton Li
j will be selected next. In this case, bidder i will play stage game strategy
σi
Li
j. When the subjective history is early, bidder i will select automaton Ei
j and play stage game strategy
σi
Ei
j. In the very ﬁrst round of the repeated internet auction, we assume that bidder i always selects the
ﬁrst automaton in his strategy si. Following the ﬁrst round, the transitions between the two automata are
dictated by the subjective history and transition index values of the automata.
To help clarify the ﬁnite automata representation of bidder strategies, we give an example below:
Example 1: Let T = 8. Consider the following soft-close auction strategy for bidder i, si:
s
i =( ( 0,2,3,1),[1,2];(8,4,5,0),[2,1])
Let vi be bidder i’s value. The ﬁrst stage game strategy tells bidder i to bid 2
3vi in period 2 (as indicated
by 2 in the 2nd digit) and vi in every extension period (as indicated by the 1 in the 4th digit). Notice
that the strategy also tells the bidder to bid
1
3vi in period 3 (the 3 in the 3rd digit). However, this part of
the strategy is superseded by the part stipulating a bid of
2
3vi in period 2, and so we can ignore the lower
bid stipulated for period 3. If a rival submits a bid in period 8 or in an extension period then the history
is late; in that case, the ﬁrst stage game strategy call for bidder i to repeat use of this ﬁrst stage game
strategy in the next auction (as indicated by the 1 in the 5th digit). Otherwise, if no rival submits a bid
in period 8 or an extension period, the history is early, and the second stage game strategy is used in the
next auction (as indicated by the 2 in the 6th digit).
The second stage game strategy, which starts at the 7th digit, tells bidder i to bid 2
3vi in period 4
(as indicated by the 8th digit) and to bid vi in period 8 (as indicated by the 7th digit). If the auction is
extended, no bid will be submitted (as indicated by the 10th digit). If a rival bid arrives in or later than
period 8, then the history is “late” and this same strategy will be played again (as indicated by by the 11th
digit), otherwise the history is “early” and the ﬁrst stage game strategy will be played next (as indicated
by the 12th digit).
The example strategy presented above can also be characterized using an alternative ﬁnite-state repre-
sentation known as a Moore machine, as illustrated below:
9    
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In the next section, we provide some theoretical analysis of the internet auction game.
4 Theoretical Analysis
Before proceeding to a simulation analysis of bidding behavior in the internet auction it will be useful to
establish a theoretical result regarding the timing of bidding behavior in a single play of the internet auction.
In particular, we can show that, regardless of whether the internet auction has a hard- or soft- close, it
is a weakly dominant strategy for bidders to bid their full valuation (fraction 1 in our implementation) in
one of the ﬁrst T − 1 periods of the dynamic auction (single-stage game) when the bidding increment is
zero. For simplicity, we consider the case with just 2 bidders, though the proof is readily extended to the
more general case with more than 2 bidders.
Theorem: Regardless of the ending rule of the internet auction, any strategy that involves bidding fraction
1 (the bidder’s full valuation) before period T weakly ex-post (and strictly ex-ante) dominates any other
strategy that does not involve bidding fraction 1 early (in one of the ﬁrst T − 1 periods) in an internet
auction with 2 bidders and with increment ∆=0 .13
The dominance of early bidding of valuations by two bidders in a single play of the internet auction
game is analogous to the dominance of the “defect” strategy in a single play of a two-person prisoner’s
dilemma game. We know that inﬁnitely repeated prisoner dilemma games admit many more equilibria than
the “always defect” equilibrium of the non-repeated game, and the same is true of the repeated internet
auction game. In particular, in the hard-close format, if there is only some probability ρ<1 that a bid
registers in the ﬁnal period, there can be gains to a strategy of late bidding in repeated internet auction
13See Appendix A for the proof.
10games; delaying bids until the end of the auction serves to dampen the ﬁnal price and raise the expected
surplus of bidders adhering to such a collusive strategy. Of course, it is not obvious which repeated game
strategy will be selected in practice, and hence we turn to a simulation analysis. In the next section, we
explain how we analyze strategic bidding in a repeated internet auction.
5 Simulations with Artiﬁcial Adaptive Agents
5.1 Some motivation
We adopt an adaptive approach in our analysis. Since adaptation requires repetition, we allow our artiﬁcial
adaptive agents to gain experience by playing a repeated-game version of the dynamic internet auction.
These artiﬁcial agents initially use randomly generated strategies. They adaptively learn to experiment and
make use of better strategies over time in a trial-and-error learning process. Speciﬁcally, we use a model of
adaptation known as “genetic algorithm.” The genetic algorithm is a population-based, stochastic directed
search algorithm based on principles of natural selection and genetics. These algorithms have powerful
search capabilities and have been shown to optimize on the trade-oﬀ between exploring new strategies
and exploiting strategies that have performed well in the past. (Holland, 1975). Economic applications
of genetic algorithms are discussed and surveyed in Dawid (1999) and Arifovic (2000). The economic
application most closely related to this one is Andreoni and Miller’s (1995) use of genetic algorithms to
ﬁnd bidding strategies in a variety of diﬀerent auction formats. Andreoni and Miller did not consider
dynamic auctions with the bidding rules of internet auctions as such auction formats were only invented
after their paper was published. Still, our approach has much of the ﬂavor of their study: the optimal
bidding strategies in repeated auction formats are diﬃcult to characterize analytically and so a numerical
search is a reasonable and promising alternative. That is, an algorithm that has been shown to ﬁnd
optimal solutions in highly complex environments –the genetic algorithm– would seem to be an excellent
candidate for characterizing bidding strategies in repeated dynamic internet auctions.
5.2 Algorithmic details
We suppose there is a population of strategies (ﬁnite automata) of the type described above. The size of
this population is ﬁxed at N. The automata in this population are initially generated randomly subject
to constraints on integer values, e.g. digits indicating the periods in which various amounts are bid must
l i eb e t w e e n0a n dT, the number of periods in an auction. Over time, this population of N strategies
evolves via the genetic operations of the genetic algorithm as described below. This evolution step occurs
only after the N strategies of the population have gained experience playing repeated internet auctions.
Speciﬁcally, the genetic operators of the genetic algorithm are called on after a ﬁxed number of blocks (a
“tournament”) has been played.
11Each block proceeds as follows. First, a set of n ﬁnite automata (bidders) are randomly chosen from the
N-member population of ﬁnite automata. Our simulations were conducted separately for groups of n =
2,3,4 or 5 bidders. Second, these n bidders play against one another for R consecutive dynamic, internet
auctions, each lasting T periods or possibly longer in the case of soft-close auctions. Our simulations
are conducted separately for hard- and soft-close auction formats. At the start of each dynamic auction,
each strategy draws a random valuation from the pdf g, and plays its strategy against the other n bidders
(strategies). The bidder’s (strategy’s) payoﬀ from an auction is the diﬀerence between the bidder’s valuation
and the price paid for the item, if the bidder (strategy) won the auction; otherwise the payoﬀ is zero. At
the end of these R auctions, each strategy is assigned a ﬁtness score. The ﬁtness of each strategy is its
average payoﬀ from all R auctions played in the block. Further blocks of auctions are then played in the
same manner, always by ﬁrst drawing n strategies at random and then having these same strategies play
one another in R internet auctions.
After a ﬁxed number of blocks has been played (300 in our simulations), average ﬁtness levels are
calculated for each strategy, taking into account the number of blocks that strategy participated in and
using the average payoﬀ that strategy earned in each block. These ﬁtness scores are used to select strategies
for reproduction in the next population, or “generation” of N strategies. These reproduced strategies may
also undergo some recombination and mutations before becoming the strategies that make up the next
generation of strategies as described below. Generation G+1is called the “oﬀspring” of generation G for
every G ≥ 1.
The genetic algorithm has three basic operators that are used to update the strategies in the population
of N strategies.
1. Selection: Some number M<Nof the best strategies of the current generation, as determined by
ﬁtness levels, are reproduced (copied intact), to be included among the set of N “oﬀspring” strategies
that comprise the next generation of N strategies. The remaining N −M next generation, oﬀspring
strategies are obtained using the crossover operation described next.
2. Crossover: Parts of the better strategies of the current generation are recombined to form the re-
maining members of the next generation of strategies. There are various crossover operators used in
the literature. We adopt the “linear crossover” operator, described in the following steps.
(a) Two parent strategies are selected randomly in proportion to their relative ﬁtness. These two
parent strategies are strings of real integers of length L; L =1 2in a soft-close auction strategy,
and L =1 0in a hard-close auction strategy.
(b) An arbitrary crossover point   ∈{ 1,...,L− 1} is randomly determined for this pair of parent
strategies.
(c) The ﬁrst  <Lintegers of the ﬁrst parent strategy and the last L −   integers of the second
parent strategy are combined to form the ﬁrst new oﬀspring strategy. Similarly, the ﬁrst  <L
12integers of the second parent strategy and the last L−  integers of the ﬁrst parent strategy are
combined to form the second new oﬀspring strategy.
(d) The crossover operation is repeated until there are N new oﬀspring strategies for the next
generation, the M strategies obtained via selection and the N − M strategies obtained via
crossover or recombination.
3. Mutation: The mutation operation applies to all of the N oﬀspring strategies created via selection
and crossover. Speciﬁcally, each integer of each oﬀspring strategy is randomly changed to another
admissible integer value with a small ﬁxed probability.
We apply these operations repeatedly to each generation following the end of each tournament, using
average ﬁtness levels over all auctions played so as to create the next generation of strategies. We run each
simulation for a number of generations. Further, we run a number of simulations for the same treatment
(number of bidders n; hard- or soft- close auction format) with diﬀerent random seed values to obtain
Monte Carlo estimates of diﬀerent statistics. A pseudo-code description of our algorithm, including our
speciﬁc parametric choices, is given below:
For i =1to 20 (the total number of simulations)
1. Randomly generate N =3 0(size of a generation) strategies for the initial strategy pool.
2. For G =1to 4000 (total number of generations)
(a) Conduct a tournament consisting of 300 repeated game blocks (internet auctions).
i. For each of these repeated game blocks, randomly match n bidders (strategies) from the
strategy pool consisting of N =3 0strategies.
(b) The ﬁtness of each strategy is the average of the payoﬀs that strategy earns in all the auctions
it is selected to participate in during the tournament.
(c) For k =1to 6, select the highest ﬁtness strategy not selected yet as an oﬀspring to be included
in the next generation of strategies.
(d) For k =7to 30, cross strategies over to generate additional new oﬀspring.
i. Choose two “parent” strategies using a “biased-random-wheel” selection: The “propensity”
of a strategy is deﬁned as the ﬁtness of that strategy minus three fourths of the smallest
ﬁtness in the generation. The probability of choosing a strategy as a parent is its propensity
over the sum of the propensities of all strategies in the generation.
ii. Cross the two parents over linearly to generate two oﬀspring strategies.
13(e) Mutate each digit in the oﬀspring strategies with probability 0.01.
i. Use a non-uniform unimodal probability distribution for mutation around the value of the
digit.
(f) Form the new strategy pool using the oﬀspring strategies.
As noted above, we conduct benchmark simulations with either n =2 ,3,4 and 5 bidders, and under
either a hard– or soft–close format.14 In these simulations, we set the expected value of the probability
density function g used to draw valuations, at m = 106, and the spread of the support interval,   =4 0 .
We choose the number of mass points in the interval [106 − 20,106 +2 0 ]as nV = 6.15 In the sensitivity
analysis reported on in Appendix B, we consider other mean values. We set the number of bidding periods
in a stage auction at T =8 . We consider R =2 0repeated auctions in each of the 300 tournament blocks
run among the strategies of a single generation. We set the discount factor δ =1 .W es e tρ =0 .9 as the
probability of bid registration in each period t ≥ 8. Finally, we set the bid increment, ∆=1 .W e a l s o
conduct supporting simulations with diﬀerent model parameters. In these sensitivity analyses, described
in Appendix B, we change one parameter at a time, and then compare new Monte Carlo estimates with
the original ones.
In the next subsection, we introduce a method for classifying strategies that aids in our presentation
of the simulation ﬁndings. We use this method to give summary statistics on the evolving strategies.
5.3 Classiﬁcation of strategies
We introduce a simple, strategy classiﬁcation method for use in interpreting the evolving strategies in our
simulation exercises. Each category in this classiﬁcation is called a “phenotype.”16 The phenotype of a
repeated game strategy (or bidder) is determined according to the following two criteria: (i) the period in
which the bidder makes his ﬁnal bid (any fraction of his valuation) for each strategy and (ii) the strategy
he plays following each history. For the ﬁrst criterion, we only take into account bidding in the normal
duration of the game, i.e. within the ﬁrst T periods. A stage game strategy is of type “E” if the bidder
completes his bidding in one of the ﬁrst T - 1 periods, and is of type “L” otherwise, i.e., the strategy
calls for a bid (of any fraction) to be placed in period T. (The classiﬁcation of “Early” or “Late” ignores
strategic behavior in extension periods of soft-close auctions). The phenotype of a repeated game strategy
is a characterization of the bidding behavior of each strategy (automata) and its transition indexes between
strategies.
14The genetic algorithm parameters were chosen in accordance with parameters suggested by computer scientists who use
genetic algorithms for complex numerical search tasks (e.g., see Goldberg, 1989).
15The mean value m =1 0 6 is a pedagogical value only; it could represent any number of units of money, e.g., cents.
16This term is inspired by a similar term for classifying genes in biological evolution.
14We can perhaps best describe the idea of a phenotype via some examples. Phenotype “E 2 1 L 1 1”
characterizes a strategy where, in the initial, ﬁrst strategy (automaton) the bidder’s ﬁnal bid (any fraction
of his value) is made early, in some period before period T; hence the “E” in the ﬁrst position. His second
strategy (automaton) involves placing a bid (of any fraction) in the ﬁnal period Tand is therefore labeled
as “L” in position 4. Positions 2–3 and 5–6 in the phenotype indicate strategy transition behavior
conditional on whether the realized history by the bidders’ rival bidders was late or early (as in the
characterization of strategies). If all rival bids also arrive early, so that the history is E, the integer 1
in position 3 of this phenotype indicates a return to the ﬁrst strategy of early bidding. If any rival bid
arrives late so that the history is L, the integer 2 in position 2 indicates that this bidder will move to the
late bidding strategy 2 for one auction and will then always switch back to the early bidding strategy 1,
regardless of the history of play in the auction where he uses the late bidding strategy; hence the integers 1
in positions 5 and 6. Phenotype “E 2 1 L 2 1” characterizes a strategy where the bidder initially bids early
and later imitates the timing of his rivals’ ﬁnal bids in the ﬁrst T periods. This phenotype characterizes
“tit-for-tat” strategies. Phenotype “L 1 2E12 ”c h a r a c t e r i z e ss t r a t e g i e sw here bidding is initially late
but moves to imitation of the timing of rivals’ ﬁnal bids. This is another kind of tit-for-tat strategy.
We note that there are just 22 such phenotypes that are possible. This number is less than 26 because
certain unconditional strategies reduce the set of phenotypes necessary to characterize strategies. For
instance, phenotype “E 1 1 L 2 1” is more compactly characterized simply as “E” denoting unconditional
early bidding; the strategy starts oﬀ bidding early (strategy 1) and never moves away from this strategy
(it ignores the history of rival bids). Similarly, phenotype “L” denotes unconditional late bidding. The
classiﬁcation of strategies into phenotypes is illustrated in the following examples.
Example 2: The phenotype of the soft-close strategy in Example 1,
((0,2,3,1),[1,2];(8,4,5,0),[2,1])
is “E 1 2 L 2 1.”
Example 3: The following strategies have phenotype “L” (unconditional late bidding):
hard-close auction strategy ((8,6,1),[1,1];(2,4,5),[1,2])
soft-close auction strategy ((0,8,2,0),[2,1];(8,1,2,0),[1,1])
hard-close auction strategy ((8,1,5),[1,2];(8,0,0),[2,1])
Example 4: The following strategies have phenotype “E” (unconditional early bidding):
soft-close auction strategy ((0,7,1,1),[1,1];(8,4,5,1),[1,2])
hard-close auction strategy ((0,4,2),[2,1];(5,8,2),[1,2])
soft-close auction strategy ((7,6,5,1),[2,2];(5,8,7,0),[1,1])
15Example 5: The following strategy is a grim-trigger strategy in a hard-close auction with phenotype “L
12E22 ” :
((8,6,1),[1,2];(2,8,0),[2,2])
Example 6: The following is a tit-for-tat strategy in a soft-close auction with phenotype
“ L12E12 ” :
((0,8,4,1),[1,2];(2,8,5,0),[1,2])
In the next section, we use this phenotype classiﬁcation scheme to characterize the main ﬁndings from our
benchmark simulations.
6R e s u l t s
In this section and the next we summarize the main ﬁndings from our simulation exercises as a number of
diﬀerent results.
Result 1: The percentage of bidders submitting late bids (bids in period T) is signiﬁcantly greater in
hard-close auctions than in soft-close auctions.
Support for Result 1 is found in Table 1, where we observe that the fraction of bidders submitting
a late bid is always greater in hard-close auctions than in soft-close auctions with the same number of
bidders, n=2,3,4, or 5.17 For example, in hard-close auctions with just 2 bidders, 62.3 percent of bidders
are late bidders, while in soft-close auctions with 2 bidders only 2 percent of bidders are late bidders.18,19
Similar diﬀerences in the frequency of late bidding are observed in comparisons of hard- and soft-close
auctions involving 3, 4 and 5 bidders.20 Figure 1a shows the frequency of bidders submitting late bids over
time in hard-close auctions and Figure 1b shows the comparable frequency of late bidding over time in the
soft-close auctions.
17For the frequency of bidders attempting a late bid, we could divide these percentages roughly by ρ =0 .9, the probability
of registering a successful bid in period T.
18These percentages and the ones reported later in the paper are obtained by taking averages over the last 100 generations
of all 20 simulations run for each treatment.
19Recall that we consider late bids only in the “ﬁrst late” period, i.e., period T of soft-close auctions.
20The reported diﬀerences in Table 1 (and further diﬀerences in bidding behavior reported below) between the two auction
formats are always signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level using a two-sample t-test with 38 degrees of freedom. In these tests, we
use the average frequencies from each of the 20 simulation runs of the hard- and soft-close auction formats as independent
observations.
16HARD-CLOSE Number of Bidders
Statistics n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5
Number of early bids per bidder 1.910 (0.0252) 1.907 (0.0296) 2.089 (0.0524) 1.889 (0.0435)
Fraction submitting late bid 0.623 (0.0182) 0.461 (0.0387) 0.326 (0.0392) 0.123 (0.0254)
Revenue of the seller / mean value 0.954 (0.00140) 0.995 (0.000493) 0.9995 (0.0000983) 0.99998 (0.000007)
P a y o ﬀo fb i d d e r s/m e a nv a l u e 0.0229 (0.00699) 0.00174 (0.000164) 0.000130 (0.0000248) 0.000005 (0.000001)
Freq. of early bidding automata 0.0893 (0.0113) 0.429 (0.0525) 0.557 (0.0682) 0.716 (0.0871)
Freq. of late bidding automata 0.0270 (0.0042) 0.157 (0.0194) 0.104 (0.0145) 0.103 (0.0134)
Freq. of cond. bidding automata 0.884 (0.1074) 0.414 (0.0508) 0.339 (0.0417) 0.182 (0.0224)
SOFT-CLOSE Number of Bidders
Statistics n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5
Number of early bids per bidder 1.66198 (0.0344) 1.842 (0.0481) 1.819 (0.0400) 1.711 (0.0440)
Fraction submitting a late bid 0.01991 (0.0084) 0.140 (0.0290) 0.0438 (0.0144) 0.0355 (0.0113)
Revenue of the seller / mean value 0.995 (0.00215) 0.999 (0.000175) 0.99998 (0.0000131) 1.000001 (0.000003)
P a y o ﬀo fb i d d e r s/m e a nv a l u e 0.00226 (0.00108) 0.00256 (0.0000585) 0.000007 (0.000003) 0.000002 (0.0000007)
Freq. of early bidding automata 0.972 (0.1181) 0.8054 (0.0979) 0.887 (0.108) 0.868 (0.106)
Freq. of late bidding automata 0.00857 (0.0019) 0.0164 (0.0028) 0.0234 (0.0034) 0.0254 (0.0035)
Freq. of cond. bidding automata 0.0194 (0.0031) 0.178 (0.0219) 0.0894 (0.0115) 0.106 (0.0131)
Table 1: Benchmark Simulation Results (Averages and Standard Deviation of Averages over the Last 100
Generations)


















































Figure 1: The average percentage of bidders successfully submitting a late bid in hard-close and soft-close
auctions with 2,3,4 and 5 bidders.
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Figure 2: The average number of valid early bids per bidder in hard-close and soft-close auctions for
n=2,3,4, and 5 bidders.
Result 2: The frequency of late-bidding decreases as the number of bidders increases in hard-close auc-
tions. However, late bidding remains more prominent in hard-close auctions than in soft-close auctions
with the same number of bidders.
Support for this ﬁnding is found in Figure 1a and in Table 1. Note that in all cases, the number of bids
per bidder is signiﬁcantly larger than one. Multiple bidding is prominent in all auctions. The evolution of
early bids per bidders are given in Figure 2.
Result 3: The average revenue of sellers is signiﬁcantly higher in soft-close auctions than in hard-close
auctions for each number of bidders, and the average revenue of bidders is signiﬁcantly lower in soft-close
auctions as compared with hard-close auctions for each number of bidders.
Support for this ﬁnding is again found in Table 1. Results 1-3 suggest that the evolving strategies in
the hard-close auctions should be diﬀerent from the ones in other hard-close auctions.
We next consider whether there are diﬀerences in the amounts that bidders are bidding in hard- and
soft-close auctions.
Result 4: Bidders always learn to bid their full value as their ﬁnal bid in both soft-close and hard-close
auctions for all numbers of bidders, i.e., bid—shaving is not observed. More precisely, the percentage of
18evolving automata that bid full value by period T is very close to 100 percent; it is never exactly 100
percent due to ongoing mutation.
Result 4 suggests that bidders are behaving rationally regardless of the auction closing rule in the sense
that they bid their full valuation by the last period of the auction, consistent with theoretical predictions
for second-price auction formats.
We now explore whether there are diﬀerences in the frequencies of phenotypes observed in hard and
soft-close auctions. Table 1 reports some cumulative, aggregate frequencies with which early, late and
conditional bidding automata are observed across hard or soft-close auctions with n = 2, 34or 5 bidders.21
Table 2 provides some further disaggregation — speciﬁcally the average frequencies of various “phenotypes”
that exceed a small threshold,
1
30 (i.e., 1 in every generation). The main ﬁnding from our analysis of these
phenotypes is:
Result 5: Evolving strategies are more diverse in hard-close auctions than in soft-close auctions. Further,
when n is small (e.g., n = 2) there is a large fraction of “conditional” phenotypes in hard-close auctions.
Support for Result 5 is found in Tables 1-2 and Figure 3. Recall that the strategies with conditional
phenotypes tell the bidder to bid early or late depending on the history of rival bids in the previous
auction. We observe that more conditional phenotypes are observed in hard-close auctions than in soft-
close auctions. On the other hand, the frequency of unconditional early-bid phenotypes increases as the
number of bidders increases in hard-close auctions. Still, this frequency is always less in hard-close auctions
than in soft-close auctions for 2, 3, 4 and 5 bidders.
In soft-close auctions, more than 80 percent of all evolving strategies are characterized as “E” (uncon-
ditional early bidding) phenotypes (see Table 2). In hard-close auctions, the frequency of “E” phenotype
ranges from 9 to 72 percent depending on the number of bidders (see again Table 2). In the two-bidder
hard-close auctions, the phenotype “L12E21 ”i so b s e r v e dw i t haf r e q u e n c yo f5 7p e r c e n t ,h i g h e rt h a n
any other phenotype. Strategies in this phenotype tell the bidder to bid late as long as the rival bidders
also bid late. Otherwise, an early ﬁnal bid is placed. If the rival only submits early bids, this strategy
switches back to late bidding. Otherwise, the early bidding automaton is played again. The other most
common phenotype in two bidder hard-close auctions is “E 1 2 L 2 1” with a frequency of 28 percent.
This phenotype is almost identical to the earlier one except for the initial strategy which involves early
bidding. In hard-close auctions with 3 or more bidders, we observe the “E” phenotype in very high fre-
quencies ranging from 43 to 72 percent. The second most common phenotype is “L” with signiﬁcantly
lower frequencies ranging from 10 to 16 percent. There are other commonly observed phenotypes such as
“L 1 2 E 1 1”, “L 2 1 E 1 2” and “E 1 2 L 2 1”. With 3 or more bidders, it appears to be more diﬃcult
to coordinate on late bidding in hard-close auctions.
21This average is found by taking the average over last 100 generations in 20 simulations for each treatment.
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Figure 3: The average frequency of observing “unconditional early-bidding” and “conditional bidding”
phenotypes of automata in hard-close and soft-close auctions with 2,3,4 and 5 bidders.
HARD-CLOSE Number of Bidders
Phenotypes n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5
E 0.0893 0.428967 0.556583 0.7163
E12L21 0.5727 0.0881 0.068667 0.01565
E22L22 0.000267 0.064717 0.014217 0.003133
L 0.026967 0.157233 0.10435 0.102533
L12E11 0.007067 0.046483 0.09425 0.003733
L12E12 0.0009 0.040333 0.037317 0.02185
L12E21 0.275317 0.047517 0.022467 0.004383
remaining: 0.027483 0.12665 0.10215 0.132417
SOFT-CLOSE Number of Bidders
Phenotypes n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5
E 0.972017 0.8054 0.887133 0.8684
L12E11 0.000183 0.047117 0.00085 0.002917
L12E22 0.0004 0.034017 0.000817 0.007083
Remaining: 0.0274 0.113467 0.1112 0.1216
Table 2: Frequency of surviving automata phenotypes in benchmark simulations (Averages over the last
100 generations surpassing a frequency of 1/30)
207 Simulations With Adaptive Agents and Naive Incremental
Bidders
Roth and Ockenfels’ (2002) empirical ﬁndings suggest that there is a signiﬁcant amount of “inexperienced”
naive bidders participating in internet auctions. These are often ﬁrst—time bidders. A typical ﬁrst-time
bidder behavior uses a naive “incremental bidding stage-game strategy.” Following this strategy, a bidder
increases the current price by bidding incrementally higher than the current second bid whenever he is
not the current high bidder in the auction — in eﬀect bidding until he discovers the current high bid, and
bidding the necessary increment above that bid so as to achieve high bidder status. This incremental
bidding strategy proceeds so long as the current price is lower than the bidder’s value. Such a strategy is a
dominant strategy in an English auction. However, it is not dominant in hard-close, second-price internet
auctions.
In this subsection, we introduce one naive bidder to each internet auction. These bidders should be
viewed as “one—time bidders” and, indeed, they are replaced by a diﬀerent naive bidder in each auction.
These naive bidders use a simple incremental bidding strategy: they only bid whenever they are not the
current high bidder, and they only bid the lowest fraction of their value, 1
3, 2
3,o r1, that is greater than
or equal to the current price (second highest bid plus the increment ∆). We re-run all of our benchmark
simulations by replacing one of the n bidders with a naive bidder. Figure 4, which is comparable to Figure
1, shows the frequency over time with which n−1 adaptive bidders submit late bids in hard- and soft- close
auctions when there is 1 naive incremental bidder present. Notice that, by comparison with our earlier
baseline simulations without naive bidders (as shown in Figure 1) in these new simulation results with
naive bidders, the frequency of late bidding is signiﬁcantly greater in hard-close auctions and signiﬁcantly
lower in soft-close auctions. Indeed, in hard-close auctions with 1-3 adaptive bidders (we exclude the naive
bidder), this percentage reaches and stays above 70 percent.
Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth (2005) report on a laboratory experiment with human subjects who play
either hard- or soft- close auctions. In their experimental design, there are just 2 bidders in each auction
and both play 18 auction games repeatedly. They model hard- and soft- close auctions diﬀerently than
we do, but in their hard-close auctions, they do adopt a ρ value less than or equal to 1 as we do. They
report that experimental subjects engage in signiﬁcant late bidding in hard-close auctions and generally
learn to bid early in soft-close auctions. One of the striking ﬁndings of the Ariely et al. study is that in
hard-close auctions, the percentage of late bidding is higher when ρ =1than when ρ<1. This ﬁnding is
at odds with the tacit cooperation hypothesis that Ockenfels and Roth (2002) use to justify late-bidding
as an equilibrium strategy in hard-close auctions which requires that ρ<1. Consequently, Ariely et al.
pursue the hypothesis that late-bidding is a best response to the presence of naive incremental bidders.
We note that in our earlier setup without naive bidders we can replicate Ariely et al.’s ﬁnding that late
bidding increases as ρ is varied from a value less than 1 to being equal to 1. Indeed, we conducted such




















generation blocks (1 block = 400 gen)
n=1 adapt., 1 naive
n=2 adapt., 1 naive
n=3 adapt., 1 naive
n=4 adapt., 1 naive




















% ADAPTIVE bidders submitting a late bid in soft-close auctions
n=1 adapt., 1 naive
n=2 adapt., 1 naive
n=3 adapt., 1 naive
n=4 adapt., 1 naive
Figure 4: Simulation results with a naive incremental bidder. The percentage of “adaptive” bidders placing
a successful late bid in hard- and soft-close auctions with 2,3,4, and 5 bidders. To ﬁnd the percentage of
all bidders placing a successful late bid, multiply the above numbers roughly by n−1
n , since naive bidders
rarely place a late bid in the late stages of the evolution.
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Figure 5: Simulations with 1 naive and 1 adaptive bidder. The frequency of the adaptive bidder submitting
a successful late bid.
an exercise as part of our sensitivity analysis as reported on in Appendix B; this sensitivity analysis was
limited to the 2-bidder case and involved changing only 1 parameter at a time from our baseline simulation
values (as reported in Table 1). Table 3 in Appendix B reveals that in 2-bidder hard close auctions, the
fraction of late bids is 33.5 percent when ρ = .8 and increases to 60.1 percent when ρ =1 .
To perform a similar comparison with naive incremental bidders, we modify our simulation setup
somewhat so that it is more closely aligned with that of Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth (2005). Speciﬁcally, we
run simulations with 1 adaptive and 1 naive bidder where the adaptive bidder updates his strategies after
each internet auction game as in Ariely et al.’s laboratory study. That is, for comparison purposes, we set
R =1 . We also consider two values for ρ — 0.8 and 1, the values adopted by Ariely et al. (2005). The
simulation ﬁndings from this exercise are reported in Figure 5. The frequency with which adaptive bidders
submit successful late bids is given in Figure 5a. Like Ariely et al., we observe a higher frequency of late
bidding by adaptive bidders in hard-close auctions when ρ =1(nearly 100 percent) than when ρ =0 .8
(nearly 80 percent). By contrast, in soft-close auctions the frequencies of late bidding in the presence of
a naive bidder are substantially lower, at around just 20 percent. Also, bidders submit signiﬁcantly more
early bids per bidder (including the naive bidder) in the soft-close auctions as compared with hard-close
auctions (see Figure 5b).
238 Conclusions and Implications for Market Design
Our results show that late bidding is an evolutionarily sustainable phenomenon in hard-close auctions and
is far less common or sustainable in soft-close auctions. Our ﬁndings are in accordance with empirical
evidence of late bidding in hard-close auctions as reported on by Roth and Ockenfels (2002) using ﬁeld
data and by Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth (2005) using experimental data. This external, empirical validation
of our agent-based model ﬁndings gives us some degree of conﬁdence that our model might serve as an aid
in understanding other aspects of internet auctions.
Indeed, our simulation ﬁndings suggest that hard-close auctions raise lower revenue for sellers than
soft-close auctions, and that bidders fare better in terms of their payoﬀ in hard-close rather than soft-close
auctions. This result bears additional emphasis from a market design perspective.22 Since internet auction
web-sites view themselves as clearinghouses or intermediaries for the market transactions, their interests
are not clearly aligned with sellers or buyers. However, information on which auction format favors sellers
or buyers is of obvious use to these individuals, as they may be able to choose the auction format they
participate in. Therefore, it may be natural to see both formats surviving side by side, as is currently the
case.23 The points raised by our study set the stage for further investigation on the evolution of diﬀerent
market designs for internet auctions.
It should be noted that in our baseline simulations all bidders are “adaptive” learners, and eventually
they learn to use “good” strategies, i.e., ones that have them bid their full valuations by the ﬁnal period,
T. With the addition of “naive” non-learning, incremental bidders (often observed in internet auctions),
we ﬁnd an even greater contrast in the frequency of late bidding by the adaptive bidders between the two
auction formats. This ﬁnding is not so surprising; the presence of naive incremental bidders encourages
the more sophisticated (but adaptive!) bidders to delay their bidding so as to increase their likelihood
of achieving a higher surplus. In a soft-close auction, there are no gains to such a delay because any
advantages to last-minute bidding (collusion or avoidance of incremental bidders) is removed.
Bidding in internet auctions is a particularly interesting topic for economists working on market design.
Agent-based computational economics can be used as an important tool in testing alternative designs of
market clearinghouses. As we show in this study, these techniques can successfully generate many of the
empirical phenomena observed in real internet auctions and can therefore be used as a tool for eﬀectively
deciding which auction formats to adopt in applications or participate in as buyers or seller.
22It would be interesting to verify this prediction using ﬁeld data from internet auctions, though this would require
investigating auctions involving the same good under two diﬀerent closing rules, and controlling for other factors including
the number and demography of bidders, etc.
23Yahoo! auctions allow the seller to choose whether to have a hard- or soft-close to the auction.
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26Appendix A: Proof of the Theorem
Proof of the Theorem: We prove the Theorem separately for hard-close and for soft-close auctions. Let
the set of bidders be N = {1,2} and the increment be ∆=0 . We will show that a strategy which involves
bidding fraction 1 before period T weakly ex-post dominates any other strategy which does not involve
bidding fraction 1 early in a stage auction. This will imply that the prior strategy ex-ante dominates any
other strategy.
1. First, we consider a stage hard-close auction. Let σ1 be a stage game strategy of bidder 1 with the
















such that α￿ ≥ α submitted in period T. Note that α￿ = α means that bidder 1 does not submit












such that β￿ ≥ β submitted
in period T.Let σ = (σ1,σ2). Also consider a strategy of bidder 1 such that he bids fraction 1 in one
of the ﬁrst T − 1 periods. Let σ￿1 be this strategy. Let σ￿ =( σ￿1,σ 2).
After the stage game under σ, av1 will be the highest bid of bidder 1 for some a ∈{ α,α￿}. Under
σ￿, v1 will be the highest bid of bidder 1. In both cases, it is equally likely that bidder 2 will have
the highest bid, bv2, for each b ∈{ β,β￿}. We will consider 5 cases:
(a) v1 ≥ av1 >b v 2 : Bidder 1 wins the auction under both σ and σ￿ with the ex-post payoﬀ
v1 −bv2 −∆=v1 − bv2 > 0.
(b) v1 = av1 = bv2 : Bidder 1 may or may not win the auction under both σ and σ￿. His payoﬀ is 0
whether he wins or not.
(c) v1 >a v 1 = bv2 : Bidder 1 may or may not win the auction under σ depending on the arrival
time of his bid. If he wins, his payoﬀ is v1−bv2 > 0. Otherwise, his payoﬀ is 0. Bidder 1 always
wins under σ￿ with payoﬀ v1 − bv2 − ∆=v1 −bv2 > 0.
(d) v1 >b v 2 >a v 1 : Bidder 1 does not win under σ￿. His payoﬀ is 0 in this case. He wins under σ￿
with payoﬀ v1 − bv2 − ∆=v1 −bv2 > 0.
(e) bv2 ≥ v1 >a v 1 : Bidder 1 does not win under σ. He may win or lose under σ￿. His payoﬀ is 0
under both strategies.
We showed that for every highest bid submitted by bidder 2, it is a weakly best response for bidder
1 to use σ￿1 over σ1.
2. Next, we consider a stage soft-close strategy. Let σ1,σ2 and σ￿1 be deﬁned as above for the ﬁrst T
periods of the soft-close auction. In the extension periods, strategies σ1 and σ2 can involve bidding
fraction 1 or 0 only. Let σ = (σ1,σ2) and σ￿ =( σ￿1,σ2). Two cases are possible:
27(a) Under σ both agents do not bid in the extension periods, so the auction reduces to a hard-close
auction. By the proof in part 1, σ￿1 weakly ex-post dominates σ1.
(b) Under σ bidder 1 or bidder 2 bids in the extension periods: After the stage game under σ, av1
will be the highest bid of bidder 1 for some a ∈ {α,α￿,1}. Under σ￿, v1 will be the highest bid
of bidder 1. Under both cases, bidder 2 will have the highest bid bv2 for some b ∈{ β,β￿,1}.
Cases (a) to (e) outlined in the ﬁrst part of the proof still hold. However, the events are not
equally likely to occur under σ and σ￿. If we can show that bidder 1’s registered highest bid is
more likely to be higher under σ￿ and bidder 2’s registered highest bid is more likely to be lower
under σ￿, then the proof will be complete.
Bidder 1’s highest fraction can be α,α￿ or 1 under σ. His highest bid is fraction 1 under σ￿.
Therefore, the probability distribution of bidder 1’s highest bid under σ￿ weakly ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates the distribution of bidder 1’s highest bid under σ.
Bidder 2’s highest can be fraction β,β￿ or 1 under both σ and σ￿. His behavior can be observed
under three cases:
i. Bidder 2 does not bid in period T under σ2: then his highest bid will be fraction β or 1
under σ, since bidder 1 can cause an extension of bidding and bidder 2 can bid in that
extension period. On the other hand, there will be no extension period under σ￿. Hence,
bidder 2’s highest bid will be a fraction β under σ￿.
ii. Bidder 2 bids in period T but he does not bid in the extension periods: then his highest
registered bid will be fraction β or fraction β￿ with the same probability under σ and σ￿.
iii. Bidder 2 bids in period T and in the extension periods: then the probability of having an
extension period under σ is no smaller than the same probability under σ￿ since, bidder
1 may be bidding in period T under σ. Bidder 2’s fraction 1 registers with no smaller
probability under σ than under σ￿ in the extension periods. On the other hand, bidder 2’s
highest bid will be fraction β with no larger probability under σ than under σ￿. This is true,
because more extension periods under σ provide more opportunities for bidder 2 to increase
his bid over fraction β.
Cases (i) to (iii) imply that the probability distribution of bidder 2’s highest bid under σ weakly
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the same distribution under σ￿. Recall that the cumulative
distribution of bidder 1’s highest bid under σ￿ weakly ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the
same distribution under σ. Hence, strategy σ￿1 weakly ex-post dominates σ1.
28HARD-CLOSE with 2 bidders Varying Parameters in the Benchmark Simulations, Ceteris Paribus
Statistics ￿ =2 0 ￿ =4 0 0 0 m = 1000 m =1 0 9 ρ =0 .8 ρ =1 R =1 R =4 0
number of early bids per bidder 1.9602 1.8830 1.9150 1.9854 1.8669 1.9322 1.7946 2.0210
fraction of bidders submitting a late bid 0.6188 0.6409 0.6068 0.6196 0.3355 0.6015 0.0459 0.6804
avr. revenue of seller / mean value 0.9535 0.9507 0.9448 0.9545 0.9429 0.9995 0.9950 0.9488
avr. payoﬀ of bidders / mean value 0.0233 0.0247 0.0287 0.0228 0.0285 0.0003 0.0025 0.0256
freq. of early bidding automata 0.1110 0.0757 0.1237 0.1073 0.3812 0.2689 0.8896 0.0167
freq. of late bidding automata 0.0124 0.0192 0.0132 0.0505 0.0429 0.3711 0.0224 0.0057
freq. of cond. bidding automata 0.8766 0.9051 0.8632 0.8423 0.5760 0.3600 0.0880 0.9777
SOFT-CLOSE with 2 bidders Varying Parameters in the Benchmark Simulations, Ceteris Paribus
Statistics   =2 0   =4 0 0 0 m = 1000 m =1 0 9 ρ =0 .8 ρ =1 R =1 R =4 0
number of early bids per bidder 1.7842 1.4563 1.8564 1.7946 1.6401 1.8988 1.7347 1.6857
fraction of bidders submitting a late bid 0.0635 0.1708 0.0413 0.0800 0.1278 0.5335 0.0084 0.1414
avr. revenue of seller / mean value 0.9930 0.8053 0.9858 0.9941 0.9696 0.9996 0.9987 0.9812
avr. payoﬀ of bidders / mean value 0.0035 0.0968 0.0086 0.0029 0.0151 0.0002 0.0007 0.0093
freq. of early bidding automata 0.9046 0.7328 0.9246 0.8713 0.7516 0.2876 0.9254 0.7917
freq. of late bidding automata 0.0181 0.0607 0.0187 0.0367 0.0305 0.2556 0.0028 0.0281
freq. of cond. bidding automata 0.0773 0.2065 0.0567 0.0920 0.2178 0.4568 0.0719 0.1802
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis (Averages in the Last 100 Generations)
Appendix B: Sensitivity Analyses
We change one model parameter at a time in the comparative static exercises in auctions with 2 bidders
only. In Table 3, the results of these exercises are reported. Speciﬁcally, we change 1) the spread of the
value distribution from   = 40 to 20 and then to 4000, 2) the mean of the value distribution from m =1 0 6
to 1000 and then to 109, 3) the probability of last minute registration from ρ =0 .9 to 0.8 and then to
1, and ﬁnally, 4) the number of auction stages in a repeated game block from R =2 0to 1 a n dt h e nt o
40. The main ﬁndings from our sensitivity analysis may be summarized as follows (see Table 3 below for
details).
• The probability of late bid registration should be less than 1 in order to observe more prominent
early bidding in soft-close auctions. Otherwise, we observe a 50 percent frequency of late bidding
even in soft-close auctions since the expected payoﬀs are the same for bidding in any period.
• An increase in the number of stages R in a repeated-auction block has a positive eﬀect on late
bidding in hard-close auctions. As R increases, the late bidding frequency increases in the hard-close
auctions. There is no late bidding when R = 1.
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